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Introduction
This is the 50th issue of the Croatian Journal of Philosophy. The Jour-
nal, published since its fi rst day by Kruno Zakarija, the best analytic 
publisher in Croatia, has been combining the best of the local work on 
analytic philosophy, done in Croatia and neighboring countries, Slove-
nia, Serbia and Hungary, and the cutting edge international work in 
the same area. The main cooperation has been, offi cially with the Insti-
tute of Philosophy in Zagreb, and not formally but very intensely with 
IUC Dubrovnik and the Department of philosophy in Rijeka. The high 
quality international conferences from IUC, dedicated to philosophy of 
language, philosophy of science and mathematics, philosophy of mind, 
ethics and metaphysics have been, for decade and a half, providing the 
precious framework of dialogue and cooperation, well documented in 
the thematic issues published throughout seventeen years.
The present issue primarily belongs to the philosophy of language 
and linguistics series, supported by the homonymous IUC course. The 
preoccupation with philosophy of language has been a lasting feature 
of the local philosophy group, initially strongly inspired by the efforts 
of Georges Rey and Michael Devitt, beginning more than three decades 
ago, during their longer stay in Croatia. Other colleagues have then 
joined in, all the way to the present guest course directors, Barry Smith, 
Frances Egan, Michael Glanzberg and Jeff King. The present issue re-
fl ects the interests of a large part of the last year IUC meeting (the sec-
ond part is coming out soon), with a focus on philosophy of pejoratives.
In her paper, “Loaded Words and Expressive Words: Assessing Two 
Semantic Frameworks for Slurs”, Robin Jeshion assesses the relative 
merits of two semantic frameworks for slurring terms. Each aims to dis-
tinguish slurs from their neutral counterparts via their semantics. On 
one, recently developed by Kent Bach, that which differentiates the slur-
ring term from its neutral counterpart is encoded as a ‘loaded’ descrip-
tive content. Whereas the neutral counterpart ‘NC’ references a group, the 
slur has as its content “NC, and therefore contemptible”.  On the other, a 
version of hybrid expressivism, the semantically encoded aspect of a slur-
ring term that distinguishes it from its neutral counterpart is, rather, ex-
pressed. On this view, while the speaker’s attitude may be evaluated for 
appropriateness, the expressivist component of slurring terms is truth-
conditionally irrelevant. Jeshion argues that hybrid expressivism offers 
a more parsimonious analysis of slurs’ projective behavior than loaded 
descriptivism and that its truth conditional semantics is not inferior to 
the possible accounts available for loaded descriptivism. She also meets 
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Bach’s important objection that hybrid expressivism cannot account for 
uses of slurring terms in indirect quotation and attitude attributions.
The book A Word Which Bears a Sword (published in Zagreb by Kru-
Zak) came out in 2016 and was discussed at the Philosophy of Linguis-
tics and Language conference the same year in Dubrovnik. In the “Precis 
of the theoretical part of the book A Word Which Bears a Sword” Nenad 
Miščević presents his own view of pejoratives as negative terms for al-
leged social kinds: ethnic, gender, racial, and other. He argues that they 
manage to refer the way kind-terms do, relatively independently of false 
elements contained in their senses. This proposal, as presented in the 
book, is called Negative Hybrid Social Kind Term theory, or NHSKT 
theory, for short. The theory treats the content of pejoratives as unitary, 
in analogy with unitary thick concepts: both neutral-cum-negative prop-
erties (vices) ascribed and negative prescriptions voiced are part of the 
semantics preferably with some truth-conditional impact, and even the 
expression of attitudes is part of the semantic potential, although not 
necessarily the truth conditional one. Pejoratives are thus directly ana-
logue to laudatives, and in matters of reference close to non-evaluative, 
e.g. superstitious social kind terms (names of zodiacal signs, or terms 
like “magician”). A pejorative sentence typically expresses more than one 
proposition and pragmatic context selects the relevant one. Some propo-
sitions expressed can be non-offensive and true, other, more typical, are 
offensive and false. Pejoratives are typically face attacking devices, al-
though they might have other relevant uses. The NHSKT proposal thus 
fi ts quite well with leading theories of (im-)politeness, which can offer a 
fi ne account of their typical pragmatics.
Testimonial injustice is a hot topic in social epistemology. In her con-
tribution Julija Perhat whose work is focused pejoratives (in particular, 
gender pejoratives for women) tries to connect them with injustice. Here 
she gives a precis of pejoratives and testimonial injustice and her present 
topic is testimonial injustice perpetrated by the serious use of pejoratives, 
in particular, gender pejoratives. Perhart combines two strands: on the 
one hand, the work on testimonial injustice where she relies on Miranda 
Fricker’s work, and on the other hand, her own central area of interest, 
gender pejoratives.
Katherine Ritchie in her article “Social Identity, Indexicality, and 
the Appropriation of Slurs” stresses the point that slurs are expressions 
that can be used to demean and dehumanize targets based on their mem-
bership in racial, ethnic, religious, gender, or sexual orientation groups. 
Almost all treatments of slurs posit that they have derogatory content 
of some sort. Such views—which she calls content-based—must explain 
why in cases of appropriation slurs fail to express their standard deroga-
tory contents. A popular strategy is to take appropriated slurs to be am-
biguous; they have both a derogatory content and a positive appropriat-
ed content. However, if appropriated slurs are ambiguous, why can only 
members in the target group use them to express a non-offensive/posi-
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tive meaning? Here, she develops and motivates an answer that could 
be adopted by any content-based theorist. She argues that appropriated 
contents of slurs include a plural fi rst-person pronoun. She shows how 
the semantics of pronouns like ‘we’ can be put to use to explain why only 
some can use a slur to express its appropriated content. Moreover, she 
argues that the picture she develops is motivated by the process of ap-
propriation and helps to explain how it achieves its aims of promoting 
group solidarity and positive group identity.
Bianca Cepollaro in her “Let’s not worry about the reclamation worry” 
discusses the Reclamation Worry (RW), raised by Anderson and Lepore 
2013 and addressed by Ritchie (this issue) concerning the appropriation 
of slurs. She argues that Ritchie’s way to solve the RW is not adequate 
and she tries to show why such an apparent worry is not actually prob-
lematic and should not lead us to postulate a rich complex semantics for 
reclaimed slurs. To this end, after illustrating the phenomenon of appro-
priation of slurs, she introduces the Reclamation Worry, and then argues 
that Richie’s complex proposal is not needed to explain the phenomenon. 
To show that, she compares the case of reclaimed and non-reclaimed 
slurs to the case of polysemic personal pronouns featuring, among oth-
ers, in many Romance languages. She introduces the notion of ‘authori-
tativeness’ that she takes to be crucial to account for reclamation and 
focuses on particular cases (the “outsider” cases) that support her claims 
and speak against the parsimony of the indexical account. She concludes 
with a methodological remark about the ways in which the debate on ap-
propriation has developed in the literature.
Next three papers have a different theme. In her contribution “The 
Myth of Embodied Metaphor (the paper was also presented at the Philos-
ophy of Linguistics and Language Conference in Dubrovnik 2016) Niko-
la Kompa is critical of the leading embodied metaphor approach. She 
points out that according to a traditionally infl uential idea metaphors 
have mostly ornamental value. However, current research stresses the 
cognitive purposes metaphors serve. According to the Conceptual Theory 
of Metaphor (CTM) expressions are commonly used metaphorically in or-
der to conceptualize abstract and mental phenomena. More specifi cally, 
proponents of CTM claim that abstract terms are understood by means 
of metaphors and that metaphor comprehension, in turn, is embodied. In 
this paper, Nikola Kompa argues that CTM fails on both counts.
In contemporary epistemology, the view is that in order to have 
knowledge it is necessary to have an appropriately based belief. Guido 
Melchior in his paper under the title of “Baseless Knowledge” argues that 
baseless knowledge can then be defi ned as knowledge where the belief is 
acquired and sustained in a way that does not track the truth. He argues 
that rejecting this view leads to controversial consequences but he does 
not say which belief bases constitute a suffi cient condition for knowledge. 
The point he is making is that assuming that appropriate bases consti-
tute a necessary condition for knowledge has controversial consequences.
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And fi nally, Adelin Costin Dumitru in “On the Moral Irrelevance 
of a Global Basic Structure: Prospects for a Satisfi cing Suffi cientarian 
Theory of Global Justice” interrogates the Rawlsian concept of a basic 
structure in the context of global justice. His aim in this paper is twofold: 
to show that the existence of a global basic structure is irrelevant from 
the standpoint of justice; and to set the stage for a cosmopolitan theory of 
global justice that employs satisfi cing suffi cientarianism as a distribu-
tive principle.
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